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Abstract
This paper evaluates the Prescott (2004) hypothesis that permanently higher payroll
taxes fully explain the decline in number of market hours worked in Europe (relative
to America) over three decades. The Prescott model made assumptions that, in steady
state, left out any incentive for either international capital mobility or international
exchange of goods. We study a one-good model where the imposition of higher payroll
taxes in one region leads to higher domestic real interest rate in that region. As a result,
there are incentives for international capital outows into the high payroll tax region
with the consequence that number of market hours worked in the low payroll tax region
also decline. With identical tastes and rate of time discount across the two regions, we
nd that the number of hours worked in the market, home work, and leisure are equalized
across the two regions. In the multi-good model, when factor price equalization holds so
free trade acts as a substitute for factor mobility, we show that there is also equalization
of market work, home work, and leisure across the two regions.
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1. Introduction
In an important paper, Prescott (2004) argued that the substantial decline in labor supply
of French, Germans and Italians in the past three decades could be fully explained by the
increase in their effective marginal tax rates on labor. (While Europeans worked more hours
for market pay than Americans in the 1970s, they now work only about three-quarters as
many hours as Americans.) That a rise in labor taxes discourages labor supply in the short
run is not controversial. Given wealth, a reduction in the reward to work causes a substitution
away from market work. However, as the reduced take-home pay causes individual savings
to also fall, we would expect that over time the decline in wealth would act to counteract
the substitution away from market work. Moreover, in the long term, the decline in wealth
in the region or country with the higher marginal tax rates on labor could cause changes in
the prices of domestic factors and goods, which would prompt international flows of goods
and capital. The Prescott argument that higher labor taxes in one region (Europe) causes
permanently fewer market hours there, however, is made in a model with two essentially
isolated economies. In the Prescott model, there are neither incentives for international capital
mobility nor international exchange of goods and services in the long run.
In this paper, we study the effects of labor taxes on market and home work in a two-region
world in which there are incentives for international lending and borrowing and incentives for
the international exchange of goods and services. We first study a one-good model in which
there is an incentive for cross-border capital flows when one of the regions imposes a payroll
tax.1 We find that, in a two-region world with identical discount rates and preferences, the
increase in labor taxes in one region (with tax revenue being used to finance government
purchases) leads to a higher autarkic interest rate as residents in that region decumulate
wealth by more than their aggregate hours fall. As a result, there is an incentive for capital
1The model is set up in such a way that, in the absence of asymmetric payroll tax rates, both regions are
ex ante identical. As opposed to a model that ties down the real interest rate to the value of the time discount
parameter in steady state as in the Prescott model, we adopt an overlapping generations model where the
real interest rate can differ from the time discount parameter in the long run. Consequently, when there is
an asymmetry in the payroll tax rates across the two regions, incentives are created for international capital
flows despite identical time discount rates and preferences.
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outflow from the other region until there is an equalization of the national interest rates. With
the other region accumulating wealth, we find that, in the long run, there is an equalization
of the market and home work across the two regions.
We study a second model with two goods, a Solow good and a pure consumption good.2
We find that, with wealth decumulation, the country that imposes a tax on labor ends up
with a lower autarkic long-run capital-labor ratio. Under free trade, it ends up importing
the relatively capital-intensive good. With unhindered international exchange of goods and
services, there is an equalization of goods prices and real interest rates as well as of hours of
market and home work across the two regions. Thus we find that once there are incentives for
international capital mobility or international exchange of goods and services, higher marginal
taxes on labor in one region do not have unequalizing effects on market and home work across
regions given identical preferences and rates of time discount. This finding of equalization
of market and home work across the two regions in the long run despite higher marginal
taxes on labor in one region holds even when we let the Solow good in the second model be
produced by assembling a continuum of differentiated intermediate products and adopt the
Krugman-Helpman set-up of monopolisitc competition in that sector.
Suppose, on the other hand, that there is complete specialization in production under free
trade in goods. Then, factor prices would be unequal across the two regions. Would it then
follow that a permanently higher payroll tax rate in one region leads it to a permanently
lower aggregate level of employment as argued by Prescott (2004)? We show that such an
outcome of unequal factor prices cannot be an equilibrium if we allow free international capital
mobility. Prescott’s quantitative model assumed zero international capital mobility, and had
the property that there was no incentive for international lending and borrowing in steady
state, an assumption that might be questioned given the lowering of barriers to international
capital flows between Europe and America since the late 1960s (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004).
A central result we obtain in this paper is that in a world of perfect international capital
mobility, the region that raises its payroll tax rate does indeed contract employment initially.
However, a reduced take-home pay rate also has negative effects on savings and thus on wealth
next year and beyond. In the long run, wealth would tend to decrease in the same proportion
2As in the one-good model, the Solow good can alternatively be used for consumption or investment.
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as after-tax wages. As it is the after-tax wage relative to non-wage income from wealth ratio
that determines the optimal number of hours supplied to the market (Hoon and Phelps (1996)
first derived this relationship), and that ratio is pinned down by the common world interest
rate, the number of hours worked is equalized across regions in the long run if preferences and
time discount rates are identical.
While our paper is motivated by the desire to evaluate the generality of the hypothesis
that differences in payroll tax rates across regions fully explain permanent differences in home
and market work, it is also related to the trade literature that endogenizes the determinants
of comparative advantage. The classic paper of Findlay (1970) takes the national savings rate
and population growth rate as primitive determinants of long run comparative advantage.
Matsuyama (1988) retains the Findlay (1970) structure but makes the national savings rate
endogenous with intertemporal utility maximization for given preferences. Baxter (1992) also
adopts intertemporal utility maximization in a two-good model exhibiting Ricardian Equiva-
lence but with fixed aggregate labor supply. In our paper, we abstract from population growth
as a determinant of effective labor supply and instead focus on the length of the workweek
(which is endogenous) as a basis for comparative advantage alongside the endogenous supply
of wealth in a model exhibiting non-Ricardian Equivalence. More specifically, we develop
here an overlapping generations two-region model in which physical capital accumulation, the
length of the workweek, and the trade pattern are all endogenously determined in response to
the asymmetric imposition of payroll taxes.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the household side of
the model at both the individual and aggregate levels. Section 3 studies the one-good model
while section 4 studies the multi-good model. Section 5 examines the role of social wealth in
influencing the adjustment of private wealth to the imposition of payroll taxes and thus the
influence on the number of hours spent in market work. Section 6 concludes.
2. Individual Behavior and Aggregation
Demographics are as described in Blanchard (1985). At any instant, a new cohort, com-
posed of many agents, is born, with its size normalized to θ. Because of the large number
3Hoon (forthcoming) incorporates a non-traded good sector in the analysis of the effects of payroll taxation.
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of agents born in each cohort, each facing an instantaneous probability of death θ that is
constant throughout life, the size of a cohort born at time s as of time t is θ exp−θ(t−s) and
the total population size at any time t is
∫ t
−∞ θ exp
−θ(t−s) ds = 1.
We first focus on an individual’s choice of his time spent in market work, non-market
housework, and time for leisure.4 We explicitly model the choice of time spent in three
activities: the market sector, non-market housework, and leisure. Building upon Benhabib,
Rogerson and Wright (1991), we suppose that the period individual utility function is given
by
U = log cˆ+ A′ log[L¯− lm − ln] +B′, if lm > 0
= log cˆ+ A′ log[L¯− lm − ln], if lm = 0,
where A′, B′ > 0 and cˆ ≡ cµmc1−µn , 0 < µ < 1. Here, L¯ is time endowment, lm is time spent
working in the market sector, ln is time spent in non-market housework, cm is consumption of
the market good, and cn is consumption of the home produced non-market good. We assume
that the non-market good is produced according to cn = snln; sn > 0. Notice that as in
Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991), we suppose that working in the market sector gives
positive direct utility, presumably because one enjoys certain social interactions and types of
mental stimulation at the work place that one does not get by devoting all of one’s time to
leisure and home work. We assume that there is a fixed positive utility value from working
in the market sector (given by B′) that is independent of the actual number of hours worked.
In contrast, the utility value derived from housework comes indirectly from consuming the
home-produced good generated by the time input into the non-market sector.
To ensure that every living person in the economy spends a positive amount of time working
in the market in order to facilitate aggregation, we make the assumption that the direct utility
value from spending a positive amount of time in the market (B′) is sufficiently large.
Assumption 1: B′ > µ−1(A′ + 1− µ)[log L¯− log(L¯− 0+)].
Under Assumption 1, a very wealthy individual who might have chosen to retire in a model
without a positive utility value from market work spends a very small positive amount of time
4Freeman and Schettkat (2005) and Rogerson (2008) emphasize the role of non-market work in explaining
the differences in market work between Europe and America.
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working in the market (lm = 0
+ > 0) given the positive utility value of market work compared
to housework in our model.
The agent maximizes
∫ ∞
t
{log[(cm(s, κ))µ(cn(s, κ))1−µ] + A′ log[L¯− ln(s, κ)− lm(s, κ)] +B′} exp−(θ+ρ)(κ−t) dκ
subject to
cn(s, t) = snln(s, t),
dw(s, t)
dt
= [r(t) + θ]w(s, t) + vh(t)lm(s, t)− cm(s, t),
and a transversality condition that prevents agents from going indefinitely into debt. As in
Blanchard (1985), agents save or dissave by buying or selling actuarial bonds, that is, bonds
that are cancelled by death. Here, ρ is the subjective rate of time discount, θ is the constant
instantaneous probability of death so θ−1 is the expected remaining life, w(s, t) is non-human
wealth at time t of an agent born at time s, and vh(t) is after-tax wage rate.5 The rate of
interest on actuarial bonds is r(t) + θ.
From the optimal choice of cm, lm, and ln, we obtain, after some manipulation, the following
two relationships:
µvh
cm
=
A′
L¯− ln − lm , (1)
(1− µ)sn
cn
=
A′
L¯− ln − lm . (2)
Uisng (1) and (2) to get cn/cm = (1− µ)sn(L¯− lm)[(A′ + (1− µ))cm]−1, and using cn = snln
in (2) to obtain ln = (1 − µ)(A′)−1[L¯ − ln − lm], we can eliminate ln and cn and write the
individual’s intertemporal optimization problem simply as
Maximize
∫ ∞
t
{log cm(s, κ) + A log[L¯− lm(s, κ)] +B} exp−(θ+ρ)(κ−t) dκ
subject to
dw(s, t)
dt
= [r(t) + θ]w(s, t) + vh(t)lm(s, t)− cm(s, t), (3)
5We assume that the take-home wage per hour worked in the market is independent of the age of the agent.
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where
A ≡ µ−1[A′ + (1− µ)],
B ≡ µ−1(1− µ) log
[
(1− µ)sn
A′ + (1− µ)
]
+ µ−1A′ log
[
A′
A′ + (1− µ)
]
.
The solution to the agent’s modified problem immediately above, having solved out ln and cn,
is given by
cm(s, t) = (θ + ρ)[h(s, t) + w(s, t)], (4)
L¯− lm(s, t)
cm(s, t)
=
A
vh(t)
, (5)
where human wealth is given by
h(s, t) =
∫ ∞
t
[lm(s, κ)v
h(κ)] exp−
∫ κ
t
[r(ν)+θ]dν dκ. (6)
Aggregate consumption is obtained by aggregating (3), (4) and (6) over all agents alive at
time t. Denoting aggregate variables by upper case letters, we obtain
Cm(t) = (θ + ρ)[H(t) +W (t)], (7)
H˙(t) = (r + θ)H(t)− vh(t)Lm(t), (8)
W˙ (t) = r(t)W (t) + vh(t)Lm(t)− Cm(t), (9)
where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative and the aggregate variable X(t) is
defined as X(t) ≡ ∫ t−∞ x(s, t)θ exp−θ(t−s) ds. Aggregating (5) over all agents alive at time t,
we obtain
ACm(t)
L¯− Lm(t) = v
h(t). (10)
Moreover, using cn = snln in (2), and aggregating over all agents alive at time t, we obtain
Ln(t) =
[
1− µ
A+ (1− µ)
]
[L¯− Lm(t)], (11)
L¯− Ln(t)− Lm(t) =
[
A
A+ (1− µ)
]
[L¯− Lm(t)]. (12)
Once we have solved for the aggregate number of hours spent in market work, Lm(t), (11) and
(12) give us, respectively, the aggregate number of hours spent in home work and leisure.
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We note that although every worker faces the same hourly pay, the fact that the mem-
bers of the labor force are of different ages means that their wealth levels are different, and
consequently, the number of hours worked will be different across the different age cohorts.
In working with a model with overlapping generations as described in Blanchard (1985), we
face the possibility of some individuals who live forever having a rising consumption profile
over their lifetimes even when the economy is in a steady state.6 Such individuals who live
forever and become very rich in this model will still spend a positive (though vanishingly
small) amount of time in market work given Assumption 1. This facilitates aggregation and
preserves the tractability of the Blanchardian model despite endogenizing the work-leisure
choice.
Taking the time derivative of (7), and using (8) and (9), we obtain
C˙m = (θ + ρ)[rW + (r + θ)H − Cm]. (13)
Using (7) in (13), we obtain, after re-arrangement of terms,
C˙m
Cm
= (r − ρ)− θ(θ + ρ)W
Cm
. (14)
3. The One-Good Model
There is a production technology for the output of the Solow good (Y ) that is constant
returns to scale in labor (Lm) and capital (K) satisfying the Inada conditions: Y = Lmf(k),
where k ≡ K/Lm is the capital-labor ratio, with limk→∞ f ′(k) = 0; limk→0 f ′(k) =∞; f(0) =
0; f ′(k) > 0; f ′′(k) < 0. Under perfect competition, the optimal choice of capital and labor
by price-taking firms gives
r = f ′(k), (15)
6The reason we do not use an infinitely-lived representative agent model as in Prescott (2004) is that
applying such a model in a world economy with perfect international capital mobility leads to national wealth
being degenerate. To obtain non-degenerate wealth in the open economy, we can either use the Blanchard-
Yaari model where all individuals face a constant and identical probability of death or a model of overlapping
and unconnected infinitely-lived families as in Weil (1989) and Obstfeld (1989). Our results in this paper
carry through if we adopt the Weil-Obstfeld characterization of demographics instead of the Blanchardian
characterization.
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vf = f(k)− kf ′(k), (16)
where r is the real interest rate and vf is the demand wage paid by the firm. The latter is
related to the take-home wage, vh, by vh ≡ vf/(1+ τ), τ being the payroll tax rate. The total
tax revenue collected is τvhLm, which we assume is used to finance government purchases (G)
so τvhLm = G. To understand the workings of the model, it is helpful to first consider a small
open economy that takes the world interest rate, r∗, as parametrically given.
3.1 Wealth adjustment in the small open economy
With the domestic interest rate being pinned down by the world interest rate, r∗, we
also pin down the optimal capital-labor ratio, k∗, from (15). The demand wage is accordingly
pinned down from (16): vf∗ = f(k∗)−k∗f ′(k∗). We note from (10) that, defining C˜m ≡ Cm/vh,
we can write C˜m = ψ(Lm); ψ
′(Lm) < 0. Noting that
˙˜Cm = ψ
′(Lm)L˙m, vh ≡ vf/(1 + τ), and
using (14), we obtain a dynamic equation showing the evolution of Lm:
ψ′(Lm)L˙m = (r∗ − ρ)ψ(Lm)− θ(θ + ρ)(1 + τ)W
vf∗
. (17)
From (9), we obtain the following dynamic equation giving the evolution of wealth, W ≡
K + F , where F is the holding of net foreign assets:
W˙ = r∗W +
(
vf∗
1 + τ
)
[Lm − ψ(Lm)]. (18)
Under the assumption obtained in Blanchard (1985) giving saddle-path stability in the
case of the small open economy, which we call Assumption 2, we obtain a system represented
by (17) and (18) that is also saddle-path stable in the two variables, Lm and W , the latter
being a state variable:
Assumption 2: r∗ < θ + ρ
Figure 1 shows the dynamic properties of the system represented by (17) and (18) given an
initial W0. Suppose that the payroll tax rate, τ , is initially equal to zero and the economy is
in a steady state. We wish to study how the economy’s total hours supplied to the market
and wealth will evolve in response to a sudden unanticipated permanent increase in τ . We
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observe that, by setting L˙m and W˙ , respectively, equal to zero, we obtain
(r∗ − ρ)ψ(Lm) = θ(θ + ρ)
[
(1 + τ)W
vf∗
]
, (19)
r∗(1 + τ)W
vf∗
= ψ(Lm)− Lm. (20)
Inspecting (19) and (20), we see that an increase in τ leads to an equiproportionate decline in
wealth that leaves (1+ τ)W and Lm invariant. In Figure 2, we show the dynamic adjustment
path taken in response to the sudden permanent increase in τ . At the initial wealth level, Lm
drops the most in response to the higher payroll tax rate. (We note from (11) and (12) that
the reduction in market work is compensated by proportionate increases in home work and
leisure.) Gradually, however, as savings become negative and wealth declines, the total number
of hours spent in market work increases (and home work and leisure decrease proportionately).
Finally, when wealth has fully adjusted, total hours allocated to market work, home work and
leisure are all restored to their original levels despite the higher payroll tax rate. We obtain
the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the small open economy taking the world interest rate as parametrically
given, the payroll tax is neutral for market work, home work, and leisure in the long run.
3.2 The Prescott long-run result
It is useful to contrast the long-run result of neutrality of payroll taxes in the small open
economy with Prescott’s result of long-run non-neutrality in the closed economy. In the
Prescott model, the long-run rate of interest is pinned down by the rate of time discount, ρ,
so via (15), we have ρ = f ′(kss), where the optimal capital-labor ratio, kss, is pinned down by
ρ. From (16), we also pin down the real demand wage with vfss = f(kss) − kssf ′(kss). From
the wealth accumulation equation expressed in steady state so W˙ = 0, and W ≡ K, we now
have
ρ(1 + τ)K
vfss
= ψ(Lm)− Lm,
which we can re-express as
ρ(1 + τ)kss
f(kss)− kssf ′(kss) =
ψ(Lm)− Lm
Lm
. (21)
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From (21), we obtain the following derivative, which says that an increase in the payroll tax
rate, τ , decreases market work, Lm:
dLm
dτ
= −
[
ρkss
f(kss)− kssf ′(kss)
] [
L2m
ψ(Lm)− L2mψ′(Lm)
]
< 0.
Why do we obtain long-run neutrality with the imposition of the payroll tax in the small
open economy but not in the closed economy of Prescott (2004) despite the fact that, in both
cases, the optimal capital-labor ratio is uniquely pinned down by the exogenously given world
real interest rate and the rate of time discount, respectively? To get the answer, we note
that, since Lm = φ(C/v
h); φ′(C/vh) < 0 from (10) so market work depends inversely on the
consumption to take-home pay ratio, the consumption falls in proportion to the decline in
take-home pay due to the imposition of the payroll tax in the small open economy but falls
by less than proportionately in the closed economy. More precisely, in the case of the small
open economy, noting (7) and (8) in the steady state, we can write
Lm = φ
(θ + ρ)
[
vf∗Lm
r∗+θ + (1 + τ)(k
∗Lm + F )
]
vf∗
 , (22)
where W ≡ K + F , F being net foreign assets, r∗ = f ′(k∗) and vf∗ = f(k∗) − k∗f ′(k∗). As
we saw from our analysis in subsection 3.1, in the long run, wealth adjusts fully to offset the
decline in take-home pay, vh. More explicitly, since we can write W ≡ K + F = k∗Lm + F ,
the wealth adjustment in response to the payroll tax comes from a decline in net foreign
assets, F . What (22) tells us is that the proportionate decline in consumption in response to
the payroll tax is achieved via a decline in net foreign assets at the given world real interest
rate. If, for simplicity, the small open economy was initially neither a net creditor nor debtor,
the imposition of a payroll tax turns it into a net debtor. Feeling poorer, individuals in this
economy work more to exactly compensate the disincentive to work due to the higher payroll
tax.
In Prescott’s closed economy model, we have, in place of (22),
Lm = φ
(
vfssLm + ρ(1 + τ)kssLm
vfss
)
, (23)
where W ≡ K, ρ = f ′(kss) and vfss = f(kss) − kssf ′(kss). What (23) tells us is that when
the payroll tax rate increases, and wealth (made up entirely of K) decumulates, the need to
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maintain the optimal capital labor ratio (kss) pinned down by the rate of time discount (ρ)
means that Lm must decline in proportion to the decline in wealth. This, however, leaves
consumption higher relative to the new lower take-home pay, vh.
If we place two such economies or regions together that are initially in steady state, one
with a higher payroll tax rate than the other, and allow free international capital mobility,
there will in fact be no incentive for international lending or borrowing as the domestic real
interest rate will be equal. (Without loss of generality, we will suppose that the payroll tax
rate, τ , is zero in one region (Region A) and positive in the other (Region B).) In the next
sub-section, we will study two initially isolated economies with the overlapping generations
structure introduced in section 2.
3.3 The two-region global economy
We consider first a single closed economy with the demographic structure described in
section 2. Following Prescott (2004), we let the production function be Cobb-Douglas so
y = kα; 0 < α < 1. Competitive behavior by firms leads to r = αk−(1−α) so k = (α/r)1/(1−α)
and vf = (1− α)kα = (1− α)(α/r)α/(1−α). The condition that L˙m = 0 gives
r = ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)(1 + τ)
1− α
(
α
r
)
Lm
ψ(Lm)
, (24)
while the condition that W˙ = 0, where W ≡ K gives
[
α
1− α
]
=
[
1
1 + τ
] [
ψ(Lm)
Lm
− 1
]
. (25)
Substituting out for ψ(Lm)/Lm in (24) using (25), we obtain
r = ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)
1− α
(
α
r
) [
α
1− α +
1
1 + τ
]−1
. (26)
We now consider two regions in the global economy, Region A and Region B, which are
initially isolated from each other. Without loss of generality, we suppose that in Region A,
τA = 0, while in Region B, τB = τ > 0. From (25) and (26), we find that in Region B (the
high marginal labor tax rate region) the number of hours of market work (Lm) is fewer and the
domestic interest rate (r) is higher compared to Region A, that is, (LBm)autarky < (L
A
m)autarky
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and (rB)autarky > (r
A)autarky. In contrast to the Prescott (2004) model, there is now an
incentive for international capital mobility with capital flowing from Region A to Region B.
Allowing for perfectly free international capital mobility, we have interest rate (r) equal-
ization and equalization of the demand wage (vf ) across regions. By setting L˙im and W˙
i,
i = Region A, B, respectively, equal to zero, we obtain
(r − ρ)ψ(Lim) = θ(θ + ρ)
[
(1 + τ i)W i
vf
]
, (27)
r(1 + τ i)W i
vf
= ψ(Lim)− Lim, (28)
where τA = 0 and τB = τ > 0. Using (28) to substitute out for (1 + τ i)W i/vf in (27), we
obtain
(r − ρ)r = θ(θ + ρ)
[
1− L
i
m
ψ(Lim)
]
. (29)
Since the righthand side of (29) is monotone decreasing in Lim, the equalization of the real
interest rate under perfect international capital mobility implies the international equalization
of hours worked, that is, LAm = L
B
m even though the payroll tax rate is higher in Region B.
Since (LBm)autarky < (L
A
m)autarky in autarky, we can have a better understanding of the
mechanism leading to the equalization of market work across the two regions under perfect
international capital mobility, (LBm)capital mobility = (L
A
m)capital mobility, by examining the net
foreign asset position of each region. The regions start off in autarky with Region B facing
a higher real interest rate as a result of the higher payroll tax. Residents in region A are
then attracted by the higher return to invest in Region B until the real interest rate is
equalized across the regions, that is, r = α(kA)−(1−α) = α(kB)−(1−α), where kA ≡ KA/LAm
and kB ≡ KB/LBm. However, as LAm = LBm under perfect international capital mobility, we
must have (KA)capital mobility = (K
B)capital mobility = Kcapital mobility. Defining F > 0 as the
size of net foreign assets of Region A (equivalently, net foreign liabilities of Region B), the
non-human wealth of residents in Region B is given by WB ≡ KB − F while the non-human
wealth of residents in Region A is given by WA ≡ KA + F .
How do we calculate the size of F? We note from (27) that since LAm = L
B
m and both regions
face the same real interest rate (r) and demand wage (vf ), we have (1+τB)WB = (1+τA)WA.
With τA = 0 and τB = τ > 0, without loss of generality, and KA = KB = K under perfect
13
international capital mobility, we must have (1 + τ)(K − F ) = K + F . Solving, we find that
F =
τK
2 + τ
. (30)
Thus we prove that Region B (with the higher marginal payroll tax rate) ends up as a net
debtor and Region A becomes a net creditor. Using (30) and the definitions of WA and WB,
we can show that
WA =
[
2(1 + τ)
2 + τ
]
K, (31)
WB =
[
2
2 + τ
]
K, (32)
so, clearly, WA > WB, that is, residents in Region A become wealthier than residents in
Region B.
A question of interest is what happens to the number of hours of market work in Region A
as a result of the net capital flows that occur in response to the payroll tax imposed in Region
B? To get the answer, we note from setting τ = 0 in (25) that, in autarky, the number of
market hours worked in Region A is given by[
α
1− α
]
=
[
ψ((LAm)autarky)
(LAm)autarky
− 1
]
, (33)
and setting τ = 0 in (26) gives us the autarkic real interest rate:
(rA)autarky = ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)
1− α
(
α
(rA)autarky
) [
α
1− α + 1
]−1
. (34)
With perfect international capital mobility so that rA = rB = r, using (31) in (27) and (28),
and making a substitution, gives us
r = ρ+
[
θ(θ + ρ)
1− α
] (
α
r
) [
α
1− α +
2 + τ
2(1 + τ)
]−1
, (35)
[
α
1− α
]
=
[
2 + τ
2(1 + τ)
] [
ψ((LAm)capital mobility)
(LAm)capital mobility
− 1
]
. (36)
Comparing (33) to (36) we find that, with (2+ τ)/[2(1 + τ)] < 1, we have (LAm)capital mobility <
(LAm)autarky, that is, wealth accumulation through the generation of current account surpluses
in Region A in response to the higher real interest rate (caused, in turn, by the higher payroll
tax rate) offered by region B leads to a decline in the number of hours of market work in
Region A compared to autarky.
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Using (32) in (27) and (28), and making a substitution, gives us, with perfect international
capital mobility so rA = rB = r, (35) and
[
α
1− α
]
=
[
2 + τ
2(1 + τ)
] [
ψ((LBm)capital mobility)
(LBm)capital mobility
− 1
]
. (37)
Comparing (25) (applied to Region B in autarky with payroll tax rate τB = τ > 0) to (37),
and noting that [(2+τ)/(2(1+τ))] > (1+τ)−1, we infer that (LBm)autarky with the imposition of
payroll taxation is less than (LBm)capital mobility. Thus the possibility of capital inflows increases
the foreign indebtedness of residents in Region B, which acts as a spur to the supply of
market work. Although the imposition of higher payroll taxes in Region B leads to a decline
in market work in Region B in autarky, the possibility of running account deficits leads to
a decline in wealth that partly acts to boost the supply of market work until the number of
hours of market work is equalized across the two regions. We can summarize the results in
this sub-section as follows:
Proposition 2: In a two-region world with both regions initially in autarky, the imposition
of higher payroll taxes in one region leads that region to have fewer hours of market work and
higher autarkic real interest rate in steady state. However, with the possibility of international
capital mobility, the region with the higher payroll taxes ends up as a net debtor as it attracts
capital inflows and the low payroll tax region ends up as a net creditor. Market work, home
work, and leisure end up being equalized across the two regions in the long run with free
international capital mobility.
4. The Multi-Good Model
4.1 Free trade with factor price equalization
We introduce two goods, Good 1 being a Solow good and Good 2 a pure consumption
good. We choose Good 1 as the numeraire and define p as the relative price of Good 2.
Production functions are Cobb-Douglas with Y1 = Lm1k
α
1 ; Y2 = Lm2k
β
2 ; 1 > β > α > 0,
where k1 ≡ K1/Lm1 and k2 ≡ K2/Lm2, with Good 2 being the relatively capital-intensive
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good.7 Profit maximization by price-taking firms gives us
vf = (1− α)kα1 = p(1− β)kβ2 , (38)
r = αk
−(1−α)
1 = pβk
−(1−β)
2 . (39)
Sectoral labor allocation is given by Lm1 + Lm2 = Lm and sectoral capital allocation is given
by K1 +K2 = K. Denoting the wage-rental ratio as ω ≡ vf/r, manipulation of (38) and (39)
gives
ω = Φ1/(β−α)p−1/(β−α), (40)
kα1
kβ2
=
[
1− β
1− α
]
p, (41)
where Φ ≡ αα(1− α)1−α[ββ(1− β)1−β]−1.
With utility being derived from the demand for two market goods, the individual dynamic
optimization problem is now amended to
Maximize
∫ ∞
t
{log[(cm1(s, κ))η(cm2(s, κ))1−η] + A log[L¯− lm(s, κ)] +B} exp−(θ+ρ)(κ−t) dκ
subject to
dw(s, t)
dt
= [r(t) + θ]w(s, t) + vh(t)lm(s, t)− cm(s, t),
where cm(s, t) ≡ cm1(s, t) + pcm2(s, t). We define total government purchases of the market
goods asGm ≡ Gm1+pGm2 withGm1/Gm = η, pGm2/Gm = 1−η and τvhLm = Gm. Equations
(7) to (14) continue to hold with the additional condition giving the relative consumption
demand of Goods 1 and 2:
Cm1
Cm2
=
[
η
1− η
]
p. (42)
If we place two regions together that initially have zero payroll taxes and government
purchases and focus on the steady state, there would neither be incentives for international
capital mobility nor international exchange of goods. We then suppose that Region B imposes
a permanent positive payroll tax while allowing for the possibility of free trade. The question
we wish to answer is: Does the high payroll tax Region B end up with fewer market hours
in the long run compared to the low payroll tax Region A in the presence of unhindered
7The main proposition of this sub-section is robust to a change in the assumption of relative factor intensity.
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international exchange of goods? (Without loss of generality, we suppose that the payroll tax
rate in Region A, τA, is zero while the payroll tax rate in Region B is positive, τB = τ > 0.)
Using (14) in the steady state, and noting that WA ≡ KA, WB ≡ KB, CBm = (1 +
τ)−1vfLBm+ rK
B and CAm = v
fLAm+ rK
A, we find that with free trade leading to international
factor price equalization, the following must hold:8
r = ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)
vf
(1+τ)
(
KB
LBm
) + r = ρ+ θ(θ + ρ)vf(
KA
LAm
) + r . (43)
From (43), we infer that
(1 + τ)
(
KB
LBm
)
=
(
KA
LAm
)
. (44)
Noting from (10) that Lm = φ(Cm/v
h); φ′(Cm/vh) < 0, CBm = (1 + τ)
−1vfLBm + rK
B and
CAm = v
fLAm + rK
A, we obtain
LAm = φ
(
LAm
[
1 +
(
1
ω
)(
KA
LAm
)])
, (45)
LBm = φ
(
LBm
[
1 +
(
1
ω
)
(1 + τ)
(
KB
LBm
)])
. (46)
With free trade so that both regions face the same relative goods price, (40) tells us that
the wage-rental ratio, ω, is identical in both countries. Thus, using (44) in (45) and (46), we
infer that the number of market hours worked is equalized across the two regions (LAm = L
B
m)
despite the fact that Region B has the higher payroll tax rate. With free trade, the imposition
of higher payroll taxes in Region B is to cause wealth decumulation and to turn the region
into the relatively capital-scarce region. Under trade, Region B ends up as the net-importer
of the relatively capital-intensive good but the residents there supply the same number of
market hours as residents in the low payroll tax region.
We next solve for the world market-clearing relative price, p. Using the global goods
market clearing conditions,
∑
i=A,B[C
i
mj + G
i
mj] =
∑
i=A,B Y
i
j ; j = 1, 2, we can express, after
some simplifying steps,
p =
(
1− η
η
)[
k2 − (KA/LAm) + k2 − (KB/LBm)
(KA/LAm)− k1 + (KB/LBm)− k1
] [
kα1
kβ1
]
. (47)
8We later consider the case where international factor price equalization does not hold.
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Noting that k1 = [α/(1−α)]ω and k2 = [β/(1−β)], and using (41) and (44), we can re-express
(47) as
1 =
(
1− η
η
)(
1− β
1− α
)
(
β
1−β
)
ω −
(
2+τ
2(1+τ)
) (
KA
LAm
)
(
2+τ
2(1+τ)
) (
KA
LAm
)
−
(
α
1−α
)
ω
 . (48)
Noting that r = αα(1− α)1−αω−(1−α) and vf = αα(1− α)1−αωα, we have, from (43),
αα(1− α)1−αω−(1−α) = ρ+ θ(θ + ρ)
αα(1−α)1−αωα(
KA
LAm
) + αα(1− α)1−αω−(1−α) . (49)
Taking note of (40) that links the wage-rental ratio, ω, uniquely to the relative price, p, (48)
and (49) give two equations that allow us to solve for KA/LAm and p. The solution is illustrated
in Figure 3 with the GG schedule representing (48) and the KK schedule representing (49).9
With KA/LAm determined under free trade, we can also determine K
B/LBm = (1+τ)
−1KA/LAm.
It is helpful to study Region A’s autarkic equilibrium and compare it with its free trade
equilibrium because this helps us understand the mechanism through which free international
exchange of goods leads to the equalization of market hours worked despite Region B’s higher
payroll tax rates. The autarkic general equilibrium in Region A can be summarized by (49)
and
1 =
(
1− η
η
)(
1− β
1− α
)
(
β
1−β
)
ω −
(
KA
LAm
)
(
KA
LAm
)
−
(
α
1−α
)
ω
 . (50)
Comparing (50) with (48), noting that (2 + τ)/(2(1 + τ)) < 1 and using Figure 3, we can
check that, under free trade, the GG schedule is moved to the right. Thus, in autarky, Region
A faces a lower p and thus lower real interest rate and higher ω and lower KA/LAm. Using
(45), we infer that (LAm)autarky > (L
A
m)free trade. In the model economy, the imposition of a
permanently higher payroll tax rate by one region of the world (Region B) leads to wealth
decumulation and global capital shortage in the long run. As a result, the relative price of
the relatively capital-intensive good is raised for the world economy and the real interest rate
is increased (compared to a case of zero payroll taxes).
We summarize our results in this sub-section as follows:
9If we make the opposite assumption that Good 2 is relatively labor-intensive, the GG schedule becomes
positively sloped while the KK schedule becomes negatively sloped.
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Proposition 3: In a world of free international trade in goods with factor price equaliza-
tion, the imposition of a permanently higher payroll tax rate in one region leads to wealth
decumulation in that region with the result that it becomes a net-exporter of the relatively
labor-intensive good. Market work, home work, and leisure end up being equalized across the
two regions in the long run with free international exchange of goods.
Suppose that the size of the payroll tax rate imposed in Region B is sufficiently large that
wealth decumulation, in the absence of international capital flows, leads Region B to end up
being completely specialized in its production activity. In this case, international factor price
equalization breaks down. Does this imply that higher payroll taxes in one region then have
permanent unequalizing effects on the two regions’ labor supplies? The answer is that, in
this case, with the domestic real interest rates being unequal across the two regions, there
will be an incentive for international capital flows. Applying (27), (28) and (29), we see that
international capital flows would occur until rA = rB = r so that LAm = L
B
m.
4.2 Free trade with monopolistic competition
It is of some interest to extend the analysis to intra-industry trade since this is empirically
relevant in describing the trade flows between Europe and America. This sub-section sets
out to study the effects of the imposition of higher payroll taxes in one region when both
inter-industry as well as intra-industry trade takes place. In the model of sub-section 4.1,
we now make the assumption that the Solow good, Good 1, is assembled from differentiated
intermediate inputs according to a CES aggregate of a variety of differentiated intermediate
products, Y1 = [
∫ nx
0 x
θ
jdj]
1
θ , with elasticity of substitution given by (1−θ)−1, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, where
xj denotes the input of intermediate good of variety j and nx denotes the number of varieties.
With perfect competition in the supply of the Solow good, the unit cost of production is equal
to the price (being unity since we take the Solow good as numeraire), that is,
1 =
[∫ nx
0
p
−θ
1−θ
xj dj
]−(1−θ)
θ
.
Under symmetry, we obtain
px = n
1−θ
θ
x . (51)
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We assume that Good 2 is produced according to Y2 = Lm2k
β
2 as before.
In the monopolistically competitive sector which produces the horizontally differentiated
intermediate good, we assume that capital is the fixed factor, and so the fixed cost of setting
up a differentiated good firm is rfk. To produce a differentiated product of the amount x
requires a labor input of axx. The optimal choice of employment gives rise to
vf = p(1− β)kβ2 = pxθa−1x , (52)
where p is the relative price of Good 2 and px is the price of intermediate input measured
in terms of the Solow good. Free entry and exit imply pxx − [vfxax] = rfk. Using (52), the
zero-profit condition gives
x = a−1x
[
θ
1− θ
] [
r
vf
]
fk,
which, using lx = xax, gives us the per differentiated good firm employment of
lx =
[
θ
1− θ
] [
r
vf
]
fk. (53)
Capital intensity in the monopolistically competitive sector is given by
kx ≡ fk
lx
=
[
1− θ
θ
] [
vf
r
]
. (54)
Using r = pβk
−(1−β)
2 along with (52), we also have
k2 =
[
β
1− β
] [
vf
r
]
. (55)
In what follows, we assume that (1 − θ) > β so the intermediate input is relatively more
capital intensive. The adding up constraints are given by
Lm = nxlx + Lm2, (56)
K = nxfk +K2. (57)
Noting (51) and (52), we obtain vf = n(1−θ)/θx θa
−1
x . With the two regions freely trading
with each other, both regions use the same number of varieties and thus the real demand wages
are equalized. With real wages being equalized and free trade ensuring that both regions face
the same relative price (p), the capital intensity (k2), wage-rental ratio (v
f/r), and the real
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interest rate (r) are also equalized across the two regions. Applying (43) to (46), we infer that
the number of market hours worked is equalized across the two regions (LAm = L
B
m) despite the
fact that Region B has the higher payroll tax rate. Once again, with free trade the imposition
of higher payroll taxes in Region B is to cause wealth decumulation and to turn the region
into the relatively capital-scarce region. Under trade, Region B ends up as the net-importer
of the relatively capital-intensive good but there is also intra-industry trade in differentiated
intermediate inputs. The residents in the high payroll tax region supply the same number of
market hours as residents in the low payroll tax region.
Under the free trade equilibrium with factor price equalization, we have the following
system of four equations to solve the four endogenous variables: nx, ω ≡ vf/r, KA/LAm, and
LAm.
nx =
LAm
[(
KA
LAm
)
−
(
β
1−β
)
ω
]
[
1−
(
θ
1−θ
) (
β
1−β
)]
fk
, (58)
LAm = φ
(
LAm
[
1 +
(
1
ω
)(
KA
LAm
)])
, (59)
θn
1−θ
θ
x
axω
= ρ+
θ(θ + ρ)
θn
1−θ
θ
x
ax
(
KA
LAm
) + θn 1−θθx
axω
, (60)
(1− η)
θn
1−θ
θ
x
βax
 [2 + τ
1 + τ
] 1 +
(
KA
LAm
)
ω
 =

(
β
1−β
)β
1−
(
θ
1−θ
) (
β
1−β
)
×
2ωβ − ( θ
1− θ
)(
2 + τ
1 + τ
) (KA
LAm
)
ω1−β
 . (61)
5. The Role of Social Wealth in Influencing Adjustment of Private Wealth
Suppose that payroll taxes are used, not only to finance government purchases, but are
also used to finance entitlements that are received by agents independent of the number of
hours worked. We let yg be the flow amount of entitlement received per agent at each instant.
The dynamic budget constraint of an agent born at time s in period t is now given by
dw(s, t)
dt
= [r(t) + θ]w(s, t) + vh(t)lm(s, t) + y
g(t)− cm(s, t).
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An agent’s human wealth can now be thought of as consisting of two components:
h(s, t) =
∫ ∞
t
[l(s, κ)vh(κ)] exp−
∫ κ
t
[r(ν)+θ]dν dκ+
∫ ∞
t
yg(κ) exp−
∫ κ
t
[r(ν)+θ]dν dκ. (62)
The first component on the righthand side of (62) is the present discounted value of the agent’s
current and future labor market earnings net of payroll taxes while the second component
represents the present discounted value of government entitlements and can be thought of as
social wealth. We will now show how, in the presence of social wealth, private wealth still
adjusts in response to the sudden unanticipated permanent increase in payroll taxes to boost
labor supply but does not now fully adjust.
In the small open economy facing the parametrically given world interest rate of r∗, the
evolution of aggregate human wealth and non-human wealth are now given, respectively, by
H˙ = (r∗ + θ)H − vhLm − yg, (63)
W˙ = r∗W + vhLm + yg − vhψ(Lm), (64)
where W ≡ K + F and Cm/vh = ψ(Lm). The government budget constraint is given by
τvhLm = G+ y
g. The dynamic evolution of market hours worked is represented by
ψ′(Lm)L˙m = (r∗ − ρ)ψ(Lm)− θ(θ + ρ)(1 + τ)W
vf∗
, (65)
where vf∗ is the real demand wage pinned down by the parametrically given world interest
rate.
We find now that, in the steady state, in place of (19) and (20), we have
r∗ − ρ = θ(θ + ρ)(1 + τ)W
ψ(Lm)vf∗
, (66)
r∗(1 + τ)W
ψ(Lm)vf∗
+
(1 + τ)yg
ψ(Lm)vf∗
= 1− Lm
ψ(Lm)
. (67)
Substituting out for [(1 + τ)W ]/[ψ(Lm)v
f∗] in (67) using (66), we obtain
r∗(r∗ − ρ)
θ(θ + ρ)
+
(1 + τ)yg
ψ(Lm)vf∗
= 1− Lm
ψ(Lm)
. (68)
The righthand side of (68) is monotone decreasing in Lm. We observe from (68) that if there
is no social wealth so yg = 0, the steady state Lm is independent of τ . On the other hand,
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when yg > 0, we check that the derivative obtained from (68) is negative:
dLm
dτ
=
−
[
yg
ψ(Lm)vf∗
]
1
ψ(Lm)
−
[
(1+τ)yg
(ψ(Lm))2vf∗ +
Lm
(ψ(Lm))2
]
ψ′(Lm)
< 0. (69)
What the phase diagram in Figure 4 representing (64) and (65) together with the derivative
in (69) tells us is that the wealth decumulation that occurs in response to a permanent
unanticipated increase in the payroll tax does restore the supply of market work but the
restoration is not complete in the presence of social wealth.
6. Conclusions
This paper has been motivated by the desire to evaluate the Prescott (2004) hypothesis
that permanently higher payroll taxes fully explain the decline in number of market hours
worked in Europe (relative to America) over three decades. The Prescott model, however,
made assumptions that, in steady state, left out any incentive for either international capital
mobility or international exchange of goods. We proceed by first studying a one-good model
where there are no incentives for the international exchange of goods but where the imposition
of higher payroll taxes in one region leads to higher domestic real interest rate in that region.
As a result, there are incentives for international capital outflows into the high payroll tax
region with the consequence that number of market hours worked in the low payroll tax
region also decline. With identical tastes and rate of time discount across the two regions
as Prescott (2004) assumed, we find that the number of hours worked in the market, home
work, and leisure are equalized across the two regions. In the multi-good model, when factor
price equalization holds so free trade acts as a substitute for factor mobility, we show that
higher payroll taxation in one region leads to wealth decumulation so that the high payroll
tax region ends up being relatively capital scarce. As a result, it becomes a net-importer of
the relatively capital-intensive good. The low payroll tax region ends up as the net exporter
of the relatively capital intensive good, and relative to a position of autarky, finds that the
international trade prompted by the imposition of a higher payroll tax in the other region
leads it to decrease the number of hours worked in the market. Under free trade, there is
equalization of market work, home work, and leisure across the two regions. The latter result
of equalization of hours worked continues to hold when we introduce intra-industry trade.
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